PROPOSED PLAN FOR REALIGNMENT OF CERTAIN AGENCY FUNCTIONS

- 1. A series of Management Staff studies of CIA operations undertaken within the past year disclose that serious deterrents to operating efficiency could be removed by realignment of Agency functions. Therefore, it is recommended that the Office of Collection and Dissemination be redesignated the Office of Reference and Dissemination and that the major functions listed below be transferred as indicated.
- 2. Coordination of information requirements and assignment of collection action from OCD, Liaison Division, to joint control of the requirements Staffs of the Assistant Directors of ORE and OSI.

Discussion: The functions of coordinating requirements and assigning collection action are so closely integrated that they can properly be considered as a single function. Experience has shown that requirements have been most easily satisfied when informal liaison with the collecting agency is possible in the initial stages of requirements formulation. The timing of requirements, as well as the information to be collected, must be evaluated for collectability by the collector. In many cases, the collector is the dominating factor as to whether certain information can be obtained and should be formalised as a requirement. Full coordination of requirements in the production offices will, as a matter of course, provide for the participation of 00 and 80 in the requirements activity. Also, it is anticipated that the requirements coordination activity will encompass, in varying degrees, participation of both intelligence contributors and information collectors of all the agencies represented on the IAC. Thus, collection action will be effected on an agree-

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ment basis as well as on an assignment basis. As a joint responsibility of ORE and OSI, each requirement will be processed by the Agency component who is most interested in obtaining the necessary information for the proper evaluation of intelligence, with such requesting component being empowered to negotiate directly with the collecting facilities at an early stage of requirement formulation.

Further, there will be one less echelon in the requirements process. Experience has indicated that for every additional echelon between the formulation of a request and the completion of the action, the basic information desired is adulterated and possibly weakened. Also, the time taken to effect completed action on a requirement is lengthened by the additional processing required.

Under normal circumstances, the Management Staff would rarely recommend that a major function be placed under joint control of two Assistant Directors. In this case, however, it appears workable because scientific requirements are primarily generated in the Scientific Intelligence Committee. Thus, except in isolated instances, all requirements of OSO, OPC, OO, and other intelligence Agencies referred for coordination will fall within the jurisdiction of ORE and can be directly routed to this Office for action. Coordination of ORE and OBI requirement activity can be enhanced by installation of uniform procedures and by physically locating these two Staffs in adjoining space.

3. Collection of intelligence materials available in operating units of other government agencies from OCD, Lieison Division, and from ORE, Presentation Division, to Office of Operations.

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There is a very important further point to be considered in conjunction with assignment of the overt collection function. It is one thing to collect material, record it, index it, and place it on shelves for future reference. It is a quite different proposition to collect intelligence materials analyse, select, and edit the information and prepare information reports from these materials in satisfaction of information requirements of the production analysts. Also, OO, who is now CIA's primary overt collection facility, has the experience, resources, and capabilities to effect a better collection action than OCD, ORE, or OSI for whom overt collection is a secondary responsibility.

4. Governmental limison controls and records from the Limison Division, OCD, to Inspection and Security Staff.

Discussion: Primary Agency control of official liaison of CIA employees with employees of other government agencies is vested in IASS, who in the final instance determines from a security standpoint whether liaison contact may be established and continued. Therefore,

it would appear logical that I&SS should approve or disapprove original contacts, should supervise liaison establish on a continuing basis, and should maintain the control registers. Through functional realignments suggested above, which group like functions under one office, the instance of duplication of contacts between Offices would be negligible. The Assistant Directors, as part of their administrative duties, are presently controlling duplication of contacts between divisions of their Offices and other agencies of the Government.

5. Machine records support for administrative operations from Machine Methods Division, OCD, to the Special Support Staff.

Discussion: It is a known fact that economy and efficiency can be obtained from centralization of like machine records activities. It is wholly reasonable that the Offices in L and K Buildings do not wish another office to handle their very sensitive T/Os, rosters, etc. Conversely, the other parts of the Agency could have no objection to having their administrative activities handled by a more sensitive operation in CIA. Thus, it is proposed that all the machine records support relating to administrative matters be located in L Building and handled by employees whose security clearances are acceptable to OPC, OSO and the Advisory Council.

All substantive support will be retained by OCD.

6. The mission of the Office of Reference and Dissemination would embrace the two functions implied in the new name. It would be wholly responsible for the maintenance of library and reference materials such as those now held in the Library, the Biographic Division, the Industrial Division, and the Graphics Division. As part of this reference function

it would perform certain collection activities. However, it would be a clear-cut document-type collection activity based on the fact that the materials being collected are reference materials and not a directed collection activity in the sense that 00 and 050 conduct collection. Also, it would maintain the Agency archives, the records management program, courier and messenger service, the clipping service and all such common-type services as it is now rendering. Likewise, centralized machine records support to the substantive intelligence operations of the Agency would remain the responsibility of ORD. Exclusive responsibility for the dissemination function in the Agency would constitute the second major phase of the ORD mission. It is anticipated that this function can be further centralized and become of greater service to the Agency by elimination of duplicate dissemination activities in other CIA Offices and by placing greater responsibility with disseminators for the selection of intelligence materials to be routed to CIA components. (Now in process)

7. It is felt that while some of these activities are affected by the pending decision on NSC 50, most of these suggested changes can be effected without reference to NSC 50. However, I should like to make it a matter of record at this time that should this proposal be implemented and subsequently NSC 50 should be returned to CIA directing consolidation of SO, OPC, and OO/C this Office would urge that OO/C not be incorporated into the L Building consolidation. An Office of Overt Collection, as described in this proposal, would be quite different from the activities of an Office of Covert Collection and Special Operations. It is believed that CIA could operate more effectively by maintaining an Office of Overt Collection.

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